[Note: In
a previous post I introduced Richard Dawkins' "Ultimate 747 Argument" against the existence of God. Dawkins has recently made this argument the centerpiece of his book,
The God Delusion, but in my previous post I pointed out that the argument suffers from a debilitating lack of clarity. In this second post I attempt to construct the argument formally so that we will have an easier time of dealing with it. In order to ensure that I treat Dawkins' argument fairly I have formulated three different versions of his argument. In future posts I will show how theists can respond.]
The Metaphysical Version of the 747 Argument
Dawkins’ explicit claim is that the 747 Argument is aimed at (G), the proposition that such a being as God actually exists. If so, then the argument is essentially about
metaphysics. It purports to show the extremely high improbability that a certain type of being actually exists. If we assume that his argument is against (G), and that his comments referring to certain theistic design arguments are only incidental to this primary aim, then we have an argument that looks like the following:
(i) All entities (potential or actual) possess organized complexity (C) in degrees.
(ii) For any degree of C possessed by any entity E, however, E’s possessing C entails E’s possessing improbability of existence (I) in a degree that is proportional to the degree of C possessed by E.
(iii) For any degree of I possessed by E, however, E’s possessing I entails E’s possessing a level of explanatory requirement (R) in a degree that is proportional to the degree of I possessed by E.
(iv) Thus for any posited entity E, the degree of R (explanatory requirement) possessed by E will be directly proportional to the degree of I (improbability of existence) possessed by E.
(v) For the same posited entity E, the degree of I (improbability of existence) possessed by E will be directly proportional to the degree of C (organized complexity) possessed by E.
(vi) For any entity E1 that brings about the existence of entity E2, the degree of C possessed by E1 must necessarily be greater than the degree of C possessed by E2.
(vii) Biological life is an entity that possesses an extremely high degree of C, and thus a high degree of I, and thus a high degree of R. (i. e. biological life is really complex, so it needs a really good explanation).
(viii) Thus if God created biological life, then God would necessarily possess a greater degree of C, and thus a greater degree of I, and thus a greater degree of R. [From (vi)]
(ix) In the Darwinian theory of natural selection we have a plausible explanation for the existence of biological life that does not require supernatural agency and that satisfies the very high explanatory requirement (i. e. the high degree of R that the entity of biological life possesses) posed by the existence of biological life.
(x) However, we have no equally plausible explanation for God’s existence, even though, were He to actually exist, He would necessarily have a higher degree of C, and thus I, and thus R, than biological life.
(xi) Therefore it is extremely improbable that God exists (i. e. God possesses I in the highest known degree).
Just looking at this formulation of the argument is tiring. Putting logical fatigue aside, we will call this version of the argument
747m . It begins with assertions about complexity, improbability, and the nature of explanation and ends with the conclusion that it is improbable in the highest known degree that God exists.
The Epistemological Version of the 747 Argument
I think it is clear that Dawkins has something like 747m in mind as the form of his argument that is supposed to put a decisive end to the debate over God’s existence. But perhaps he has multiple meanings and would agree that his argument can be formed in more than one way, with similar premises and assumptions that arrive at a different but related conclusion. In this case we can view Dawkins as positing a sort of “Swiss Army argument” that – in one fell swoop of unparalleled rationality - does away
both with belief in God
and with the claims of those pesky intelligent design theorists. If this is true, then in addition to 747m above, perhaps Dawkins would approve of the following version of his argument, which I will call
747e, the
epistemological version of the 747 argument:
(xii) A plausible explanation is required for how it is possible that highly complex entities exist.
(xiii) Design theorists accept (xii) and thus require a plausible explanation for the highly complex entities we find living on Earth, including human beings.
(xiv) The explanation design theorists offer for the complexity of living things is that all life was created by God.
(xv) However, if God created biological life then He would necessarily be more complex than even the most complex example of biological life.
(xvi) Design theorists do not apply (xii) to God’s existence, however, even though He would be necessarily complex.
(xvii) Hence intelligent design theories are inconsistent.
Put this way, the argument is a charge of
inconsistency on the part of those arguing for God’s existence from apparent design in the natural world, particularly contemporary intelligent design proponents. Since inconsistency is the mark of an incoherent (and thus irrational) epistemic system, I have called this version the epistemological version of the argument. Dawkins’ claim is that it is irrational or illogical to claim that the complexity of life requires an explanation but the greater complexity of God does not.
The Simple Version of the 747 Argument
Perhaps Dawkins might agree that his argument can be laid out in a much more simple way than the two formulations I have concocted above. If so, it would be to his benefit, as the
fewer premises an argument has the fewer grounds there are for disputing it. Dawkins might
approve of the following form of the 747 argument:
(xviii) The level of any entity’s complexity is directly proportional to the improbability of that entity’s existence.
(xix) If God exists, He would be the most complex entity in existence.
(xx) Unlike highly complex biological life, for which Darwinian natural selection provides a plausible explanation, we have no corresponding explanation for God’s existence.
(xxi) Therefore it is highly improbable that an entity of immense complexity like
God actually exists.
We will call this the
simple version of the 747 argument,
747s. On this account, any entity worthy of the name “God” would have to possess extreme complexity, and – in the absence of a credible account of how He exists – this extreme complexity is attended by an extreme level of improbability, and it is irrational to believe in an extremely improbable entity in the absence of an extremely satisfying explanation.
What is the theist to make of this argument, in all its myriad forms? There are numerous counterarguments the theist can make, and I'll begin to address those in the next post.
Previous posts on The God Delusion:
